State governments are not subject to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), but their political subdivisions are. Plaintiff, Uneek Virginia Lowe (Lowe) filed suit against her former employer, Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services (HCJFS), alleging violations of employment discrimination based on race, age, and disability discrimination and retaliation, under Title I of the ADA. The district court granted HCJFS summary judgment on the race and age discrimination claims, but found for Lowe on the disability discrimination and retaliation claims.
On appeal HCJFS argued that they were entitled to summary judgment. Affirming the findings of the lower court, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that HCJFS had not met the required burden of proof for sovereign immunity entitlement under the Eleventh Amendment.
The case is Uneek Lowe vs. Hamilton County Department of Job Family Services
Lowe began working for HCJFS as a Medicaid eligibility technician on January 20, 2000. Her main job function was to determine ongoing eligibility of Medicaid beneficiaries.
In 2002, Lowe was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. In May 2003, Lowe requested that she be granted reasonable accommodations for her disability. Over the next two years, Lowe took several leaves pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and was twice transferred to new (but similar) positions within HCJFS. During this period Lowe clashed with her supervisors, received her first unfavorable performance review, and became the subject of several disciplinary proceedings.
On June 10, 2004, Lowe filed a discrimination complaint against HCJFS with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging race and disability discrimination and retaliation. On November 4, 2004, Lowe was issued a “right to-sue” letter by the EEOC based on her complaint. On December 15, 2004 Lowe filed another complaint with the EEOC, claiming further retaliation after her initial filing. On February 23, 2005, Lowe sued HCJFS in federal district court based on her initial EEOC complaint and “right-to-sue” letter. On June 3, 2005 the EEOC issued Lowe a second “right to-sue” letter.
On July 6, 2005, while out on FMLA leave, Lowe received a letter from HCJFS terminating her employment. Lowe then amended her complaint to include allegations regarding her termination, as well as a number of additional claims.
HCJFS filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively for summary judgment, arguing that it was an “arm of the State of Ohio” entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity on all claims. Although the district court granted HCJFS summary judgment on a number of Lowe’s claims, it concluded that HCJFS was not entitled to sovereign immunity and denied summary judgment on Lowe’s disability discrimination and retaliation claims. HCJFS appealed.
On appeal HCJFS argued that they were entitled to summary judgment on all claims because (1) they were entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment (claiming to be an arm of the State of Ohio); (2) Lowe had failed to exhaust the required administrative remedies; and (3) the district court erred in finding that Lowe was qualified for her job as part of its determination that Lowe had set forth a prima facie case of disability discrimination.
Generally, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not immediately appealable. However, the court of appeals in this case determined that they had jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of sovereign immunity to HCJFS under the “collateral order doctrine.” The court advised that “because sovereign immunity is an immunity from trial, not just a defense to liability on the merits, the denial of a claim of sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine as a final decision.” The court held that “states and state entities that claim to be ‘arms of the state’ may ‘take advantage’ of the collateral order doctrine to appeal a district court order denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity.”
Taking advantage of the doctrine left the other two issues raised by HCJFS out of the jurisdiction of the court “because they did not fall under the collateral order doctrine nor” were “they inextricably intertwined with the issue of sovereign immunity.”
Any entity asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity has the burden to show that it is entitled to immunity, i.e., that it is an arm of the state.”
Lowe’s disability discrimination claims were brought under Title I of the ADA, which prohibits certain employers from discriminating on the basis of disability. States are immune to suits for money damages under Title I because Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers in enacting those provisions and therefore did not properly abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity from such suits. Political subdivisions of the states are not entitled to sovereign immunity from such suits. The Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity to units of local government. These entities are subject to private claims for damages under the ADA.
Whether HCJFS was entitled to sovereign immunity turned on whether it was properly characterized as a political subdivision (and thus not immune), or an arm of the state (and thus immune). In order to make their determination, the appeals court evaluated four factors: (1) the State of Ohio’s potential legal liability for a judgment against HCJFS; (2) the language employed by state courts and state statutes to describe HCJFS, as well as the degree of control and veto power which the state had over HCJFS; (3) whether state or local officials appointed HCJF S board members; and (4) whether HCJFS’s functions fall under the traditional purview of state or local government.
After evaluating all the factors, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that HCJFS had not met the required burden of proof for sovereign immunity entitlement under the Eleventh Amendment and affirmed the findings of the district court.
